"It All Depends On What Your Definition Of The Job Is"

Over the past few days there have been reports that, along with the announcement of the anticipated escalation, Bush's speech tonight will spell out "goals" the administration will expect to see met in Iraq. Without consequences for failure that are either understood implicitly or stated clearly, "goals" is a can-kicker's euphemism for more of the same. Over the past few days I've been re-reading Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest, which for my money is still the best book on Vietnam. For those who've never read it, I recommend doing so. While readers know my opinion on the Iraq-Vietnam parallels, I think it's possible to take the comparison too far. Some of the traps we fell into in Vietnam were less about that war specifically than about the mistakes leaders (particularly elected ones) have always made in wartime. Here's a passage from Halberstam (pg. 596) about the debate over escalation within the Johnson administration during 1965 that's both illustrative and relevant:

There were brief moments when the reality seemed to flash through. Once during the early-June discussions the President turned to General Wheeler and said, "Bus, what do you think it will take to do the job?" And Wheeler answered, "It all depends on what your definition of the job is, Mr. President. If you intend to drive the last Vietcong out of Vietnam it will take seven hundred, eight hundred thousand, a million men and about seven years." He paused to see if anyone picked him up. "But if your definition of the job is to prevent the Communists from taking over the country, that is, stopping them from doing it, then you're talking about different gradations and different levels. So tell us what the job is and we'll answer it." But no one said anything; it was not the kind of thing they picked people up on, and so the conversation slipped over to the other subjects, vague discussions of strategy, the difference between an enclave strategy and a security mission, and they did not define the mission.

Has Bush really defined this mission? Of what practical good is that definition if it consists solely of bromides and platitudes? I think Bush has defined the mission clearly, but his current definition of "victory" -- that magical day/week/month/year when the violence stops -- is a manifestly unrealistic justification for perpetual occupation. And so the debate over resources, especially inconsequential increments like 20,000 or so troops, is moot. What I really want to see from Bush's speech is at least a flirtation with reality; free from electoral considerations now, it's really the first time since the war started that he can do this. Reality means trusting the public's ability to understand this war beyond bromides about "victory" (really, when was the last time we heard Bush talk in detail about the various ethnic and religious issues we face in Iraq?). Reality also means defining the mission down, if even a bit. We know the administration has started to do the latter -- if only by cutting back on the utopian prattle about "democracy" in prepared speeches -- but I think it's essential that the President continue on that path, and not just by omission. Yes, he'll take flak for it. But I'd rather see the mission creep downwards than sideways or up. I also think this is his last chance to show a sliver of leadership, and perhaps apply a tourniquet to his legacy, before he leaves office.

Maybe that's my own version of utopian prattle. We'll see later tonight.