Friday Night Lowlights

A few points to make about the debate in the House last night:

1. The phrase "cut and run" is a favorite talking point, so let's think about what it means. It implies a time element---that beginning to withdraw now would be "too soon." We are approaching the three-year mark in Iraq. What length of time would suffice? Five years? A decade? "Cut and run" also implies that the "job" is not done. The main job, of course, is training Iraqis to be able to maintain their own security. So how's that going? Gen. George Casey told us in late September; read about it here. After two and a half years, we've managed to train about 800 Iraqi troops capable of operating on their own without U.S. assistance. That's not a typo---there are two zeros after that 8. How many people realize that? And for those who might argue that the capability and independence of Iraqis will increase rapidly as they gain experience and their military infrastructure grows, Gen. Casey told us that the number of Iraqi troops able to fight on their own is actually falling. At the current rate, it will take another decade to train a mere 5,000 Iraqi troops capable of fighting without our help. To achieve that objective, at our current casualty rate we would suffer about 10,000 dead U.S. troops and almost 100,000 wounded.

2. Another talking point is that a timetable---or even the debate about one!---"sends the wrong signal to terrorists" (predictably, I did not hear the word "insurgents" mentioned once in last night's debate). The corollary to this is the "wait us out" canard: the assertion that if the insurgents think we're leaving, they will simply sit tight. This implies that if the insurgents believe we are there to stay, they will lay down their arms, console themselves with a "well that's that, we gave it our best shot but darnit they're not leaving" and suddenly become good citizens.

3. Next talking point: "we can't let down the Iraqi people." Of all the arguments from the stay-the-course bunch, normally I would be most sympathetic to this one. But what do the Iraqi people think? They've made their opinion quite clear. Read about it here.

4. Over the past few days, the need to "support the troops" has been cited constantly. But supporting the troops has nothing to do with the reflexive, blind-faith acceptance of their mission. In fact, the two are mutually exclusive. The support-the-troops mantra is the most maddening and dangerous of the talking points from the stay-the-course crowd, because it betrays a fundamental failure to understand the implicit agreement that exists in a democracy between civilians and the military. Murtha (and it's no surprise, of course, that he understands this) explained this well when he said that the troops are relying on us to speak up, since they cannot do it themselves.

I explained where I stand on the withdrawal issue in this post a few months ago. Essentially, I still feel the same way: immediate en masse withdrawal would be a mistake. But particularly after Gen. Casey's report to the Senate, it has become clear that the crucial underpinning of our exit strategy---the training of Iraqis---is in shambles. Either we're not taking it seriously because we have no intention of ever leaving, or our presence serves as a disincentive for the Iraqis to take it seriously themselves. How else to explain 800 Iraqi troops capable of operating on their own after two and a half years? The only viable alternative now is to start bringing home troops regularly and incrementally. One battalion a week should return. At that pace, we would have about 40,000 fewer troops in Iraq a year from now---certainly a significant withdrawal, but appropriately phased to allow us to gauge the effects (adjusting the pace if necessary) and still respond to any military exigencies.

What's now clear is that the status quo---and all that implies for our future loss of blood and treasure---is absolutely untenable. The citizens of the two nations involved understand this, and they have spoken.