When The War Drums Beat

If the buildup to the war in Iraq taught us anything, it is that when the war drums begin to beat, logic and rationality are the first casualties. Over the past few days we've seen that process start anew. On the issue of Iran, I can't pick up a newspaper or read a blogger---and that includes some moderate conservatives I respect and view as sane---without being swamped with the now-obligatory "Islamofascists", references to 1930's appeasement, dark comparisons to Hitler, and apocalyptic predictions of imminent nuclear war. For an example of the hysteria that surrounds this issue right now, read a bit of this.

Common to all this is a sense of urgency; we can't afford to wait, assert the hawks. As we saw with the buildup to Iraq, that urgency is necessary, of course. It turns logic and rationality into irrelevant nuisances. The playbook may have gotten a bit of mud on it during the last game, but it's still the same playbook.

Before the war drums reach a crescendo, however, let's visit with a nuisance. About five months ago, a National Intelligence Estimate made some projections about Iran's nuclear program. The NIE is an agreed-upon consensus of our major intelligence agencies, including the CIA, DIA, and--yes--the NSA. From WaPo (my bolds):

A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years, according to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the new analysis.

The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that "all options are on the table."

The new National Intelligence Estimate includes what the intelligence community views as credible indicators that Iran's military is conducting clandestine work. But the sources said there is no information linking those projects directly to a nuclear weapons program. What is clear is that Iran, mostly through its energy program, is acquiring and mastering technologies that could be diverted to bombmaking.

The estimate expresses uncertainty about whether Iran's ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear arsenal, three U.S. sources said. Still, a senior intelligence official familiar with the findings said that "it is the judgment of the intelligence community that, left to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons."

At no time in the past three years has the White House attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence, as it did about Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion. Instead, it has pointed to years of Iranian concealment and questioned why a country with as much oil as Iran would require a large-scale nuclear energy program.

The NIE, ordered by the National Intelligence Council in January, is the first major review since 2001 of what is known and what is unknown about Iran. Additional assessments produced during Bush's first term were narrow in scope, and some were rejected by advocates of policies that were inconsistent with the intelligence judgments.

One such paper was a 2002 review that former and current officials said was commissioned by national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, who was then deputy adviser, to assess the possibility for "regime change" in Iran. Those findings described the Islamic republic on a slow march toward democracy and cautioned against U.S. interference in that process, said the officials, who would describe the paper's classified findings only on the condition of anonymity.

Until recently, Iran was judged, according to February testimony by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to be within five years of the capability to make a nuclear weapon. Since 1995, U.S. officials have continually estimated Iran to be "within five years" from reaching that same capability. So far, it has not.

The new estimate extends the timeline, judging that Iran will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon, before "early to mid-next decade," according to four sources familiar with that finding. The sources said the shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical limitations, puts the timeline closer to 2015 and in line with recently revised British and Israeli figures.

The timeline is portrayed as a minimum designed to reflect a program moving full speed ahead without major technical obstacles. It does not take into account that Iran has suspended much of its uranium-enrichment work as part of a tenuous deal with Britain, France and Germany. Iran announced yesterday that it intends to resume some of that work if the European talks fall short of expectations.

In January, before the review, Vice President Cheney suggested Iranian nuclear advances were so pressing that Israel may be forced to attack facilities, as it had done 23 years earlier in Iraq.

In an April 2004 speech, John R. Bolton -- then the administration's point man on weapons of mass destruction and now Bush's temporarily appointed U.N. ambassador -- said: "If we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons."

Make no mistake about it: there are many good reasons why Iran should be prevented from developing nuclear weapons. But the same was said about Saddam, with the same urgency we're hearing right now about Iran. As the momentum on this snowballs, the question of urgency must be balanced with what we know or can reasonably estimate. That's why we have intelligence agencies we fund with billions of dollars every year.

Regular readers know that I believe Iran is essentially about economic consequences and our desperate desire to avoid them, which I posted about here. On the policy level, this game within a game is the real force driving the current sense of urgency. That's why, amidst the Hitler analogies and imminent-mushroom-cloud-redux hysteria, we're not seeing much of a fact-based debate; as the WaPo piece notes, "at no time in the past three years has the White House attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence." One would think that somewhere along the way, citing such intelligence will be---if not mandatory---at the very least good form, no? In light of what our highest level of intelligence has already estimated, what happens then?

Unfortunately, this administration has proven itself unconstrained by such trivialities. And as the momentum on Iran builds, the most unlikely source for anything fact-based or rational is a one-issue president mired in a 40% approval rating who thinks he has one last chance to resuscitate both his presidency and his legacy.